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I. INTRODUCTION
In a modern society heavily dependent on computers,1 the Internet is quickly
becoming a part of everyday life in the United States and around the world.2 It is
1

See, e.g., John Pike, FAS Cyberstrategy Project: CyberStats (last modified Oct. 16, 1997)
<http://www.fas.org/cp/netstats.htm> (“By the end of this decade, the number of households
with home computers may surpass the number with cable television.”).
2

Statistics on Internet use vary greatly, but it is undeniable that the number of Internet
users is growing at a tremendous rate. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (200 million users worldwide by
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attracting the masses for a number of reasons, but largely because its services are
convenient, fast, and relatively cheap.3 Many activities that were once carried out in
person, by telephone, or by traditional mail are now taking place on this vast
computer network.
While new technologies may bring convenience and cost savings to the public,
they also bring challenges to established legal principles. Courts are just beginning
to struggle with some of the unique legal questions that the Internet has created.4 In
recent years, the legal system has wrestled with such issues as how Internet contacts
establish personal jurisdiction5 and how much Fourth Amendment protection is
afforded an e-mail message.6 And as the Internet becomes further established as a
staple of American society, many more legal questions are certain to arise.
One such question will likely involve the due process implications of sending
notice in a class action lawsuit by e-mail. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governs class actions, requires notice of “opt out” rights in a Rule
23(b)(3) class, including individual notice to identifiable members of the class.7
Traditionally, individual notice in (b)(3) class actions has been given by first-class
mail,8 up until now the most convenient and inexpensive form of individual notice in
most class actions. But notice by traditional mail may soon be a thing of the past,
replaced by e-mail notice over the Internet. As more attorneys recognize the benefits
1999); Computer Industry Almanac Inc.: Over 300 Million Internet Users in Year 2000
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.c-i-a.com/199809iu.htm> (over 327 million users world
wide by year-end 2000, up from 100 million by year-end 1997); Emerge Inc.: What’s New
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.emergeinc.com.statistics.html> (estimating 1 billion
internet users worldwide by 2001); Nua Internet: How Many Online (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html> (151 million users worldwide as
of December 1998). See also Kelly M. Slavitt, Gabby in Wonderland - Through the Internet
Looking Glass, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 612 (1998) (citing various statistics
on the growth of Internet use); Scott A. Sundstrom, You’ve Got Mail! (And the Government
Knows It): Applying the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 2064, 2064 (1998) (compiling statistics on internet use).
3

See Leonard I. Frieling, Making E-Mail Mean Effective Mail, 26 COLO. LAW 121, 121
(1997) (“E-mail is rapidly becoming an integral part of professional and personal lives. It is
almost free, quite reliable, very fast, and works, unlike telephones, on the individual schedules
of the writer and reader.”); Jeff Goodell, E-Mail, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 27, 1997, at 66 (“[Email is] [t]he best form of communication ever invented—fast, cheap, silent, and personal.”).
4
See, e.g., Compuserve Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (whether unsolicited e-mail advertisements are a form of trespass); Cyber Promotions,
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (whether the right to send
unsolicited e-mail advertisements is protected by the First Amendment).
5

See Christopher E. Friel, Downloading a Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a
Departure from the Minimum Contacts Test?, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 293 (1998) (how
internet contacts establish personal jurisdiction).
6
See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (evaluating the scope of
privacy afforded an e-mail message under the Fourth Amendment).
7

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2).

8

431 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL
PRACTICE, 7 CLASS ACTION CONTROVERSIES 277 (1992).
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of conducting business on-line,9 attorneys practicing in class action litigation will be
particularly attracted to the convenience and cost savings that notice by e-mail
affords over “snail” mail.10 While it will take a few years before e-mail notice
becomes a popular option, at least one class action, Fine v. America Online Inc., has
already utilized e-mail to serve notice.11
But like the other Internet activities that courts have struggled to reconcile with
established legal principles, e-mail notice must be reconciled with the principles of
due process. Although e-mail is still a developing technology that has its drawbacks,
this Note argues that courts should find that notice by e-mail satisfies the standards
of due process that the United States Supreme Court has developed for class action
notice. First, this Note establishes that e-mail is a form of individual notice, as
required by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.12 Second, this Note shows that e-mail
notice is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action” and “reasonably certain to inform those
affected” as required by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.13 Third, this
Note contends that due process is a flexible concept that allows for considerable
judicial discretion, which allows room for new methods of transmitting notice.14
Fourth, this Note argues that e-mail is comparable to first-class mail, which is widely
accepted as satisfying due process requirements.15 Although e-mail and traditional
9

Attorneys are recognizing not only that the Internet is efficient and convenient, but also
that in the near future their clients will demand that they use the Internet because of the cost
and time savings. See, e.g., Richard M. Georges, The Impact of Technology on the Practice of
Law- 2010, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 36, 38 (“E-mail is the most popular Internet application,
and the most used by lawyers, because it enables rapid, efficient communication and file
sharing with anyone in the world from the lawyer’s desk . . . . Some lawyers already are
conducting much of their business over the Internet using e-mail.”); Al Harrison, Delivery of
Electronic Documents, 60 TEX. B.J. 476, 476 (1998) (“Electronic communications and
electronic document transfer are rapidly becoming a focal point of modern law practice.”);
Laura W. Morgan, Attorney-Client Privilege in E-Mail Communications, 10 NO. 5 DIVORCE
LITIG. 98, 98 (1998) (“Today . . . most lawyers are online and many communicate with other
attorneys and their clients by e-mail.”); Ron Smith, Lawyers Must Overcome Technophobia,
Learn to Take Advantage of E-Mail, Net, J.KAN. B.A., Oct. 1996, at 3 (“The main reason that
sooner or later ‘the ‘Net’ is gonna getcha’ is your sophisticated clients will demand that you be
an ‘intranaut.’ Time is money, for you and your clients.”); Ron Smith, Postage Up, Email
Costs Down, J. KAN. B.A., Mar. 1995, at 7 (“Your future legal clients may demand that you
institute such cost savings as part of representing them.”).
10

Internet users refer to traditional postal mail as “snail mail” because it is slower than e-

mail.
11

Order Approving Class Notice and Directing Distribution Thereof, Fine v. America
Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997)
(“Plaintiffs’ counsel are hereby authorized to transmit the Notice to class members by E-mail
forthwith.”); Journal Entry, Fine v. America Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Court
of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997) (granting order of class notice).
12

417 U.S. 156 (1974).

13

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

14

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); see generally Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.

15

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3d § 30.211 (1995)
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mail are different in some respects, this note demonstrates that the differences: (1)
are irrelevant for purposes of due process, (2) are small enough that the broad due
process standards set forth by the Supreme Court are not violated, or (3) will
diminish as e-mail technology improves.
Finally, this Note maintains that, from a policy standpoint, e-mail notice may
actually be better than notice by traditional mail. Because e-mail notice would be
much cheaper than notice by first-class mail, cost will no longer be an obstacle for
class action plaintiffs, who must bear the cost of notice under Eisen. The cost
savings will not only benefit plaintiffs; defendants, who often bear the cost of notice
of settlement under Rule 23(e), can benefit by using e-mail as well.
Presently, e-mail notice is most viable in class actions where only an e-mail
address is available for the class member, such as in class actions that involve
Internet activities.16 But as the Internet grows and subscriber rates continue to rise, email addresses will become as common as telephone numbers and street addresses.
When that time comes, attorneys will have the choice between sending notice by email or sending it by first-class mail. Because of the convenience and cost savings,
those attorneys will likely choose to send notice by e-mail. And traditional concepts
such as due process not only should, but must be adaptable to an online society.
II. THE ESTABLISHED RULES GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS
A. The Requirements of Rule 23
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for
maintaining a class action.17 Subsection (a) sets out the four prerequisites for a class
action: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.18 A
class action must then fit into at least one of the three types of classes, described in
subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the rule.19 This Note focuses only on the
“(b)(3)” class, which may be maintained when “the court finds that questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”20 As the
rule’s Advisory Committee’s notes point out, a fraud perpetuated on many people
through similar misrepresentations is a good candidate for this type of class action.21
Rule 23 contains three notice provisions that are applicable to (b)(3) classes. The
primary focus of this Note is subsection (c)(2), which unambiguously requires notice
of membership in a (b)(3) class.22 Subsection (c)(2) provides that “[i]n any class
16

For example, in class actions involving the provision of online access, or one of the
many businesses that sell their products online, e-mail addresses would likely be available
since Internet businesses generally communicate with their customers only by e-mail.
17

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.

18

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).

19

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).

20

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3).

21

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3) advisory committee’s note.

22

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2).
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action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of
the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”23 The reason
for mandatory notice in (b)(3) classes, but not in (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes, is that the
(b)(3) class is the only type of class from which a member can exclude himself or
herself (“opt-out”).24 Therefore, the rule requires that the notice inform members of
a (b)(3) class of their rights and options:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if the member so desires, enter an appearance through
counsel.25
The other two notice provisions in Rule 23 are applicable to all class actions, not
just (b)(3) classes. Subsection (e) provides that notice is mandatory when any class
action is dismissed or compromised and must be given “to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs.”26 The final notice provision in Rule 23 is
discretionary.27 Subsection (d)(2) allows the court to order notice as it sees fit
throughout the litigation “for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action.”28
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make notice an important element of class
action litigation. The Rules establish notice as a fundamental element in (b)(3)
classes, as the mandatory notice provision set out in subsection (c)(2) demonstrates,
because of the unique opt out rights of (b)(3) class members.
B. Due Process Requirements for Rule 23 Notice
The concept of due process is embodied in both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution: “nor [shall any person] be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.”29 The fundamental right
to due process is a primary consideration in all litigation.30 Due process is a critical
23

Id.

24

Id. According to the Advisory Committee’s note, it appears that the reason for opt out
rights in (b) (3) classes but not in (b) (1) or (b) (2) classes is that the individual’s interest in
pursuing his or her own litigation is particularly compelling in claims that fall under (b) (3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2) advisory committee’s note; See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3).
25

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2).

26

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).

27

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2).

28

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2).

29

U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

30

See Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900) (“That a man is entitled to some notice
before he can be deprived of his liberty or property is an axiom of the law to which no citation
of authority would give additional weight.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)
(“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).
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concept in class actions because the judgement will affect the legal rights of the
members of the action who are not parties.31 Due process concerns are all the more
compelling in Rule 23(b)(3) classes because of the members’ opt out rights. Without
notice of their membership in the action and of their opt out rights, the rights of
absent class members in (b)(3) classes could be compromised without their control
or knowledge. Therefore, notice of the action is critical if members are to receive the
process they are due.
The drafters of the Federal Rules paid particular attention to the due process
implications of class action notice. The Advisory Committee’s notes for Rule 23
establish that the Rule’s notification requirements are “designed to fulfill the
requirements of due process.”32 The drafters relied on two United States Supreme
Court cases, Hansberry v. Lee and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., in
formulating the notice requirements to comply with due process requirements.33
In the first case relied on by the drafters, Hansberry, the United States Supreme
Court examined the potential res judicata effect of a class action on absent class
members.34 Although the opinion concerned adequacy of representation as a due
process requirement in a class action rather than notice, Hansberry was the Court’s
first decision that set forth the proposition that class actions must meet the due
process requirements of the 14th Amendment.35 The Court held that the judgment in
a class action can only be binding on absent class members if due process standards
are met.36
The second case relied on by the drafters, Mullane, sets forth the basic due
process standards that are now applied to class action notice.37 The Court held that
notice by newspaper publication was constitutionally sufficient for beneficiaries of a
common trust whose addresses could not be ascertained with due diligence, but was
insufficient protection for the due process rights of beneficiaries whose addresses
where ascertainable.38 The Court noted that “[a]n elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present the objections.”39 The Court went
31
See HERBERT B. NEWBERG AND ALBA CONTE, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.46
(3d. ed. 1992); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 34. The due process rights of
plaintiff class members are also important to the defendants in the class action so that they
may have a binding and final judgement that will not be continually subject to attack. See
NEWBERG at § 8.01.
32

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2) advisory committee’s note.

33

Id.

34

311 U.S. 32 (1940).

35

Id. at 40-43.

36

Id.

37

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

38

Id. at 318-20.

39

Id. at 314. In formulating this test, the Court relied on and cited to the case of Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). In addressing the adequacy of substituted service in acquiring
personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant, the Court stated that
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on to develop the following test for constitutionally adequate class action notice:
“The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is
in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.”40
Since the present Rule 23 was drafted in 1966, the United States Supreme Court
has had the opportunity to elaborate on the due process requirements of notice in
several cases. The first case the Court decided after the rule was enacted was Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.41 Eisen has become the primary precedent for the due
process standards for class action notice in (b)(3) classes.42 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Eisen was the culmination of almost a decade of litigation over whether
the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) were also the due process standards, with
several trips back and forth from the district to the circuit court.43 When the case
finally reached the Supreme Court, in a decision often referred to as “Eisen IV,” the
Court held that the notice requirements of Rule 23 satisfied due process standards.44
The Court reaffirmed Rule 23’s mandate that individual notice is the best notice
practicable for class members whose addresses are identifiable through reasonable
effort.45 The Court also settled a critical dispute in (b)(3) class actions: who should
bear the cost of notice. The Court disapproved of the district court’s attempt to
allocate costs between the plaintiff class and the defendant, holding that “[w]here, as
here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for
the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing the suit.”46 Eisen firmly
established that due process requires individual notice of membership in a (b)(3)
class to class members who are identifiable through reasonable effort.
Two years after Eisen, the Supreme Court addressed (b)(3) notice issues again in
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.47 In Oppenheimer Fund, the Court seemed to
back away from the hard line approach to notice issues that it took in Eisen, restoring
the notion that due process in class actions is a flexible concept. While the Court
reiterated that the representative plaintiffs must generally bear the cost of notice, the
Court clarified that Eisen does not always require that plaintiffs pay all costs incident
[I]t’s adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the
form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is reasonably
calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due
process are satisfied.
Id. at 463 (citation omitted).
40

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.

41

417 U.S. 156 (1974).

42

NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.03.

43

Id.

44

417 U.S. at 173-75.

45

Id. at 175.

46

Id. at 178-79.

47

437 U.S. 340 (1978).
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to sending notice.48 The Court held that a district court has discretion under Rule
23(d) to order a defendant to perform a task necessary to sending notice, such as the
identification of class members, if the defendant can do it with less difficulty or
expense than the representative plaintiff.49 By pointing out that “[a] district court
necessarily has some discretion in deciding . . . how notice should be sent,”50 the
Court impliedly endorsed the notion that due process in class actions is not a fixed
and rigid concept, but a flexible one that allows room for a court’s discretion.
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of the due process requirements
for (b)(3) class action notice took place in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.51 In
holding that due process does not require that out-of-state plaintiff class members
must affirmatively consent to jurisdiction,52 the Court nicely summarized the due
process requirements for a binding judgment in a class action. The Court’s summary
of due process requirements included five points: 1) “[t]he plaintiff must receive
notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation;” 2) the notice
must conform to the “reasonably calculated” standard set forth in Mullane; 3) “[t]he
notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it;” 4) “due process
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to
remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for
exclusion’ form to the court;” and 5) the named plaintiffs must adequately represent
the absent class members.53
The due process standards for class action notice provide a generous amount of
flexibility.54 With the exception of the Eisen requirement for individual notice to
class members whose addresses are reasonably ascertainable, the United States
Supreme Court has refused to set rigid rules for constitutionally adequate class action
notice. Instead, the Court has allowed for considerable judicial discretion in class
actions, subject only to the broad standards of reasonableness set forth in Mullane.
C. Traditional Methods of Transmitting Individual Notice
Absent from both Rule 23 and from the Supreme Court’s due process standards is
the mandate that individual notice to class members be transmitted by any particular
means.55 In keeping with the flexibility and discretion that due process standards
afford, trial courts have approved a number of methods for transmission of notice in
(b)(3) class actions. Representative litigation presents such a variety of
circumstances and fact patterns that courts refuse to adhere to any rigid rules for
sending notice to class members.

48

Id. at 356.

49

Id. at 355-56.

50

Id. at 360.

51

472 U.S. 797 (1985).

52

Id. at 811-12.

53

Id. at 812.

54

NEWBERg, supra note 31, at § 8.02.

55

See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2056 (1996).
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For individual notice to identifiable class members, first class mail to the
recipient’s last known address is the traditional method of transmission.56 Notably,
most courts have not required that the notice be sent by certified or registered mail.57
Although these methods may be more reliable and more likely to reach their
recipient, courts find that the expense is unjustified.58
Courts have allowed for methods of transmission in large classes that are less
costly than first-class mail, particularly in light of Eisen’s clarification that plaintiffs
must bear the cost of notice. One such method is bulk mailing.59 In one particularly
large class action, the court allowed notice printed on a single-sheet mailer or as a
postcard.60 Another common method is to include notice in the defendant’s own
periodic mailings to the class members, such as in monthly statements, billings, or
pay envelopes.61 The Supreme Court pointed out this cost-effective alternative in
Oppenheimer Fund.62
Although the Eisen Court remarked that “[t]here is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest
that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular
plaintiffs,”63 courts have traditionally given consideration to costs when deciding
how notice should be delivered to class members. The discretion given to district
courts in overseeing notice and the broad standard of reasonableness required by due
process have allowed courts to be creative in ordering the transmission of notice.
III. THE “NUTS AND BOLTS” OF E-MAIL
The most popular and creative new method of individualized communication is
electronic mail, more commonly known as “e-mail.” E-mail is one of many services
provided on the vast network of interconnected computers known as the Internet. In
just the few short years since the Internet and services such as e-mail became

56

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3d, supra note 15, at § 30.211; PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 277; Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, What Constitutes “Best
Notice Practicable,” Required by Rule 23 (c) (2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in Class
Actions Brought Under Rule 23(b) (3), 32 A.L.R. FED. 102 § 4 (1977).
57

See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 627, 632-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(notwithstanding contention that class members might disregard a first-class letter and pay
closer attention to a certified letter, mailing notice of class action by first-class mail is
sufficient); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 416, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“[n]otice need not be sent
by registered mail.”).
58

See Cayuga Indian Nation, 89 F.R.D. at 632-33.

59

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 277.

60

In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

61

See Bogosovian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1477, 1484
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). See also NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.06; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION 3d, supra note 15, at § 30.211.
62

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 355 n.22 (1978).

63

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
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accessible to the mainstream public, they are largely responsible for transforming
America into a highly computer-dependent society.64
The Internet is not a tangible entity, but rather “a giant network which
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks.”65 Each of
the smaller networks is administrated, maintained, and funded by private companies,
educational institutions, and other organizations.66 An individual computer connects
to the network through a modem, which dials into one of many central computers in
the network through traditional telephone lines.67 Although an individual computer
can access the Internet in a number of ways, many users pay commercial “Internet
service providers” or “online services” to connect them to the Internet.68 This
connection enables users to communicate and exchange information in textual,
audio, and video form.69
Once an individual connects to the Internet, that individual has access to a variety
of services. One popular service is the World Wide Web (WWW), which links
together information stored on computers connected to the Internet.70 Another
service, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), is similar to a telephone conversation except that
the participants type to each other instead of speak to each other; the parties watch
each other’s words appear on the screen as they are being typed.71
The most popular service on the Internet is e-mail.72 While the WWW is
analogous to visiting a library and IRC as analogous to talking on the telephone, email is analogous to sending a finished letter through the mail.73 In order to send and
receive e-mail, an Internet user must have an e-mail address.74 Service providers and
64
See Pike, supra note 1; see also Communication Upgrade: E-mail is as Popular as Print
Media, HR FOCUS, May 1995, at 17 (almost 9 out of 10 Fortune 100 corporations use e-mail
for person-to-person communications); Internet Use Changing U.S. Industry, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Apr. 4, 1998, at 23 (in a survey of senior executives at more than 400 U.S.
companies, 87% said they personally use the Internet and 98% reported they use it to
distribute information about their companies; 74% predicted that e-mail will be a key source
for businesses by the year 2005).
65

American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
affirmed, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
66

JOSHUA EDDINGS, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 13 (1994).

67

DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 32-33 (2d ed. 1997).

68

American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 833.

69

See id. at 834.

70

DAVID B. WHITTLE, CYBERSPACE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 201 (1997). The World Wide
Web contains millions of virtual documents called “web pages.” Each page contains
highlighted links (“hypertext”) that, when clicked on by the user’s mouse, connect the user to
related pages. See COMER, supra note 67, at 198.
71

American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 835.

72

The number of e-mail boxes worldwide is expected to quadruple in the next two years to
1 billion. Jane Hodges, Why These Guys Want to Handle the World’s E-mail, FORTUNE, Feb.
15, 1999, at 149.
73

See WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51.

74

See COMER, supra note 67, at 146.
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online services that connect users to the Internet generally provide e-mail accounts
with e-mail addresses.75 An e-mail address is like a street address but is assigned to
an individual or an organization rather than a geographic location.76 E-mail
addresses follow a standardized format: the user’s name or alias, an “@” symbol,
and the domain.77 The domain is required as part of the Domain Name System
(DNS), a system of naming the individual networks and computers that make up the
Internet.78 The domain, like a street address, tells the e-mail provider exactly which
computer to deliver an e-mail message to.79
Once a user has an e-mail address, he or she can compose and send textual
documents through the Internet to other individuals’ e-mail addresses.80 The service
provider or online service works like the United States Postal Service in delivering
the e-mail messages to the proper addresses.81 The provider/service stores an e-mail
message in a central computer until its intended recipient connects to the Internet and
accesses his or her e-mail account, at which time the provider/service delivers the
message into the recipient’s e-mail box for the recipient to read.82 Unlike traditional
mail, which can take days to be delivered, e-mail is delivered almost
instantaneously.83
IV. HOW E-MAIL SATISFIES DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
As Internet usage becomes more popular and the number of individuals with email addresses grows, individual notice in a (b)(3) class action can be sent efficiently
and inexpensively by e-mail rather than by first-class mail. The traditional standards
of due process do present some obstacles to e-mail notice: there are questions as to
the practicality and reliability of sending notice by e-mail. But the flexibility of due
process and the fact that e-mail technology will continue to improve should make it a
viable and constitutional avenue for sending notice in the very near future.
A. Notice by E-Mail Meets the Eisen Standard of “Individual Notice”
E-mail notice meets the most fundamental due process standard in class actions:
the requirement in Rule 23(c)(2) and Eisen of individual notice to class members that
are identifiable through reasonable effort.84 “E-mail is a personal communication

75

Popular services include America Online and Prodigy.

76

See WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51.

77

See id.; see also EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 91-92.

78

EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 91.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 82-83.

82

Id.

83

WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51.

84

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974).
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sent directly from one user to another.”85 Each address is attached to a person rather
than a geographic location.86 Because e-mail is a textual document that is
“affirmatively directed” at a particular user,87 it is clearly a form of individual notice,
meeting the due process standard set forth in Eisen.
One potential problem under Eisen is whether e-mail notice would be the “best
notice practicable under the circumstances.”88 By requiring the “best” notice
practicable, the standard can potentially be misconstrued as mandating that only one
method of sending notice can meet the due process requirements. However, the
Eisen Court refused to require that one method of transmission gives the best notice
practicable, only saying that individual notice was the best notice practicable when
the members can be identified.89 Following suit, courts have generally recognized
that individual notice is the best notice practicable, not that any particular method of
sending that individual notice is always the best notice practicable.90 Largely, courts
assumed individual notice meant first-class mail because, until the advent of e-mail,
it was the only method of contacting large numbers of people.
Those courts that have required that individual notice be sent a certain way, such
as by first-class mail, have done so not because it is always the “best” notice, but
because it has been “practicable under the circumstances.”91 First class mail has
traditionally been practicable under almost all circumstances because street addresses
of class members are easily ascertainable. Since e-mail is a form of individual notice
that is now “practicable,” it can meet the “best notice practicable” standard for
purposes of due process.
The more difficult problem that e-mail notice has under the Eisen standard is
whether class members’ e-mail addresses can be obtained through “reasonable
effort.” This is not an issue of due process, but rather an issue of practicability and
feasibility. One reason e-mail notice may not be practicable is because many people
still do not have e-mail addresses.92 Although the number of people with e-mail
addresses is growing exponentially,93 e-mail addresses are still not as common as

85

United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (e-mail is a form of
“one-to-one communication”).
86

WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51-52.

87

Compuserve Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997).

88

Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-75.

89

Id.

90

See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); In re
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Steiner v.
Equimark Corp., 96 F.R.D. 603 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
91

See Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 898 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Ungar
v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (D.C.Pa.), rev’d on other grounds, (531
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1975).
92

See John G. Auerbach, Getting the Message, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1997, at R22 (stating
that 20% of the U.S. population lives in households wired for e-mail).
93

See supra note 67.
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street addresses.94 Another reason for the problem is that e-mail addresses do not
automatically include the individual’s full name, making it potentially more difficult
to find an individual’s e-mail address rather than a street address.95 A third reason
why e-mail addresses may not be obtainable through reasonable effort is that there is
no central directory of e-mail addresses.96
A number of these obstacles have or will have solutions in the near future. The
staggering growth rate of e-mail use forecasts that e-mail addresses probably will be
as common as street addresses in the near future.97 Although e-mail addresses do not
automatically contain the user’s full name, numerous Internet sites provide free
“people finders” or “white pages,” in which you type the name of the individual and
the service will find his or her e-mail address.98 Third, although there is no central
directory of e-mail addresses, a number of directories do exist.99 The people finders
and Internet white pages are examples of such directories.100
94

See Auerbach, supra note 92.

95

E-mail addresses follow a standard format: the user’s name or alias, followed by an @
symbol, followed by the domain (the computer networks through which the message must be
routed to reach its recipient). WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 52. The problem is that many users
do not include their full name in their address and are not required to do so; therefore, one
cannot necessarily tell which individual is at an e-mail address by looking only at the address.
See Id.
96

Netcom Search Frequently Asked Questions <http://in-105.infospace.com/
_1_410DUDE0208VLEG_info.netcom/faq2.htm#wp>. When the Internet was small, a central
directory was feasible. EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 105. However, maintaining a central
database is now impracticable because of the size of the database and the constant changes
necessary to keep it current. Id.
97
Although economic factors had been an obstacle for many in getting online, particularly
because personal computers were expensive, this problem appears to be disappearing.
Individuals can now gain Internet access in many places without having to buy a personal
computer. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa.
1996), affirmed, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (many have free access at work; there is also free access
at libraries and cheap access at coffee shops). Individuals can also obtain e-mail addresses for
free. See MSN Hotmail (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.hotmail.com>. Computer
systems are steadily dropping in price and a large secondary market now exists. Although
Internet use was once a luxury for the upper classes, statistics now show that the demographics
of the Internet now mirror the demographics of the country’s population. Hoag Levins, Big
Net News: It’s Not News Anymore, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 1998, at 2.
98
See Netcom US People Finder (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.netcom.com/
whowhere.html>;
WhoWhere?
People
Finder
(visited
Mar.
29,
1999)
<http://www.whowhere.lycos.com>.
99
See EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 105. Similarly, people do not generally use a directory
of street addresses that includes the addresses of everyone in the United States; traditional
phone and address directories are regional. While street address directories are geographically
regional, e-mail address directories are the virtual equivalent - they are usually regional by
individual network. See Id.; see also Netcom Search Frequently Asked Questions (visited
Mar. 29, 1999) <http://in- 105.infospace.com/_1_410DUDE0208VLEG_info.netcom/
faq2.htm#wp>.
100

See Netcom US People Finder, supra note 97; WhoWhere? People Finder, supra note

97.
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Application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Oppenheimer Fund, which
permits a court to order a defendant to perform tasks that will save costs in sending
notice,101 will perhaps diminish the difficulty in locating an individual’s e-mail
address more than any of the above alternatives. As e-mail addresses become more
common, defendants of class actions will be more likely to have lists of class
members’ e-mail addresses, which, like street addresses, the court can order the
defendant to produce.102
Because of the present problems of practicability, class actions involving Internet
services or businesses will be the first types of classes were e-mail notice is feasible
because e-mail addresses of the class members are easily obtainable. The Fine case
demonstrates this proposition; Fine is a class action suit against America Online,
Inc., an Internet service provider, by its monthly subscribers for violation of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act and breach of contract.103 As Oppenheimer Fund
permits, the trial court in Fine ordered America Online to provide the plaintiffs with
the e-mail addresses of class members.104
Class action notice by e-mail in (b)(3) classes satisfies the Eisen requirement that
individual notice is the best notice practicable when individuals and their addresses
can be obtained by reasonable effort. The practicability of obtaining the e-mail
addresses of class members will increase as more people go online and the services
for finding e-mail addresses improve.
B.

E-Mail Notice Meets the Mullane Standard Because it is Reasonably
Calculated to Apprise the Class Members of the Action

E-Mail notice meets the due process standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Mullane.105 Because e-mail is a form of individual notice under Eisen, it is
“reasonably calculated to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”106 Due process does not
require actual notice in a class action, and since e-mail is a reliable form of notice, it
meets the broad standards of reasonableness in Mullane.
The Mullane standard is primarily concerned with the inadequacies of
publication notice.107 The Court pointed out that publication notice is quite likely to
fail in reaching its intended recipients; therefore, it is not “reasonably certain to

101

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356-58 (1978).

102

Id.

103

Class Action Complaint, Fine v. America Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co.
Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997).
104

Order Approving Class Notice and Directing Distribution Thereof, Fine v. America
Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997)
(“[D]efendant America Online . . . shall provide to plaintiffs’ counsel the names . . . and user
E-mail addresses of the members of the class.”).
105

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

106

Id. at 314.

107

Id. at 315-17.
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inform those affected.”108 Mullane stands for the proposition that while publication
is not reasonably calculated to reach known class members, individual notice is.109
Both the Rule 23 Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court in Eisen recognized
this by citing to Mullane when requiring individual notice.110 Therefore, the
important distinction made in Mullane is between publication and individual notice,
not between methods of sending individual notice.111 Because it is a form of
individual notice, e-mail notice meets the Mullane standard.
Although e-mail is not absolutely certain to reach its intended recipient, neither
Mullane112 nor any other Supreme Court decision requires actual notice in a class
action.113 Due process does not require that class members receive personal service,
or even certified or registered mail.114 As the Mullane Court pointed out, “[w]e think
that . . . reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are
justifiable.”115 The overriding theme of Mullane is reasonableness: the notice must
be “reasonably calculated” and “reasonably certain” to inform.116 E-mail is a
reasonably reliable method of individual communication, which is all that Mullane
requires. Millions of e-mail messages reach their intended recipients daily,117 the
sender of each “desirous of actually informing” the recipient of some piece of
information. Because e-mail is a form of individual notice that is reasonably certain
to reach its recipient, e-mail meets the due process requirements for class action
notice.

108
Id. Mullane does, however, approve of publication when the members of the class are
not reasonably identifiable because publication is the only method of informing the members
of the action. Id. The due process safeguard in such cases is adequate representation. See
also NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 4.46.
109

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-17.

110

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2) advisory committee notes; see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-75.

111

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-17.

112

Id. at 318-19.

113

The Supreme Court’s holding in Phillips Petroleum provided some uncertainty on this
point because the Court required that “the plaintiff must receive notice.” Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). However, the Court did not specifically hold that
actual notice was required. Id. Furthermore, the Court cited to Mullane and Eisen, both of
which allow for notice “reasonably calculated” instead of actual notice. Id. Therefore, the
Supreme Court has not required actual notice. Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D.
258, 260 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
114

See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-319. See also Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D.
627, 632-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d. 1483, 1485-87
(D.C. Cir. 1992); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litig., 63 F.R.D. 422, 430 (W.D. Ok.
1974); 32B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 55 at § 2056; NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.02.
115

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.

116

Id. at 314-15.

117

See generally supra note 2. The reliability of e-mail will be further discussed in Part
IV.E.1 in comparison with first-class mail.
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Due Process is a Flexible Concept, Allowing Room for Methods of
Transmitting Notice Such As E-Mail

The Supreme Court’s due process/notice jurisprudence leaves no doubt that due
process is a flexible concept, guided by practicality. This is one of the reasons why
district court judges are given discretion in deciding what constitutes proper notice in
each case.118 That flexibility allows for notice by e-mail in a class action.
Through Mullane, the Supreme Court established that the standards for due
process in a class action are flexible.119 As discussed throughout this Note, the broad
standard of reasonableness that pervades the Mullane opinion leaves considerable
leeway for different avenues of providing notice. As the Court stated after setting
out the requirement that notice be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action, “[b]ut if with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional
requirements are satisfied.”120 Where e-mail notice is practical in a particular case,
Mullane’s due process standards allow for it.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Oppenheimer Fund case
supports the proposition that flexibility is inherent in the concept of due process.
Holding that “[a] district court necessarily has some discretion in deciding the
composition of a proper class and how notice should be sent,”121 the Court created
the necessary room to allow for class action notice by e-mail.
The Supreme Court has clearly established that due process is not a fixed concept
with a rigid set of requirements that must be applied in every single case. Rather,
due process is flexible and practical, dependent on the circumstances presented in
each action. The fact that the Court has approved of the considerable judicial
discretion of Rule 23 that allows judges to control the form of notice supports the
notion that due process in a class action suit is flexible. Because due process is an
inherently flexible concept, courts should allow class action notice by e-mail in
actions in which the e-mail addresses of class members are available or reasonably
ascertainable.
D. E-Mail is Analogous to First-Class Mail, an Accepted Form of Individual Notice
One of the most persuasive reasons that notice by e-mail meets due process
standards is that it is comparable to first-class mail, the most widely accepted method

118

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 360
(1978).
119

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.

120

Id. In Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962), the Court expanded upon
Mullane’s flexibility, stating that in Mullane,
[we] thoroughly canvassed the problem of sufficiency of notice under the Due Process
Clause, pointing out the reasons behind the basic constitutional rule, as well as the
practical considerations which make it impossible to draw a standard set of
specifications as to what is constitutionally adequate notice, to be mechanically
applied in every situation.
Id. at 212.
121

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 360 (1978).
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of transmitting individual notice.122 The mere name alone, e-“mail,” demonstrates
the analogy. Although e-mail and first-class mail are not exactly the same, the
similarities are so strong that e-mail, like first-class mail, should satisfy due process
requirements.
E-mail and traditional mail are so similar because the processes by which they
are created and sent parallel one another.123 In each, the process begins with the
creation by the sender of a textual document.124 The sender then “mails” this
document to an individual at a designated address.125 A carrier, the postal service for
traditional mail and the online service provider for e-mail, delivers the mail into the
recipient’s mailbox.126 Both mails wait in the mailbox until the recipient “checks” it,
at which time he or she can then read the document.127
From the time e-mail first became known to the public, it has been compared to
traditional mail.128 Numerous commentators analyzing Internet legal issues — from
bulletin board operator liability for copyright infringement129 to personal jurisdiction
based on Internet contacts130 — have followed suit.131
122

See supra note 56.

123

See Jim Held, Getting Started with Electronic Mail, MACWORLD, Feb. 1989, at 105.

124

See supra Part III.

125

See supra Part III.

126

See supra Part III.

127

See supra Part III.

128

See Marie Alvich, The Paper Race, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING, November 1988, at 66;
Jeffrey Bairstow, Electronic Mail, INC. OFFICE GUIDE, 1988, at 73; Electronic Mail: Plain
Fax, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1987, at 78; Held, supra note 123, at 105. As early as 1982, a
study by the United States Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment recognized that
electronic mail would eventually compete with and have a serious impact on the future of the
United States Postal Service. Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress of the United
States, Report, IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC MAIL AND MESSAGE SYSTEMS FOR THE U.S.
POSTAL SERVICE (August 1982).
129

See Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the
Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L.REV. 391, 418 (1995)
(“’E-mail’ is short-hand for electronic mail, and is similar to traditional mail.”).
130

See Friel, supra note 5, at 311(“E-mail has similarities with conventional ‘snail mail.’”).

131

See Stacy B. Veeder, Electronic Mail and Privacy, JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC
LIBRARIANSHIP, Mar. 1995, at 123(“E-mail has been compared variously to first-class postal
mail, telephony, routine office paperwork, and face-to-face communications.”); Frieling, supra
note 3, at 121; David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems
and Systems Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 153 (1993) (“Since a major use for
computer information systems is sending e-mail, it is only sensible to compare such a use to
the U.S. mail.”); Keith B. Norman, The ASB Home Page: Alabama Lawyers Go On-Line For
a Wealth of Information, 57 ALA. LAW. 328, 328 (1996) (“First class mail, or snail mail,
cannot compete with E-mail.”); Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?:
Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 471-72 (1998) (“[E]mail messages are indistinguishable from snail-mail letters in regard to the elements of
defamation.”); John T. Soma & Alexander J. Neudeck, The Internet and the Single Document
Rule: Searching For the Four Corners of the Electronic Paper, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
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Recognizing the similarities, a number of federal courts have recognized e-mail
as the equivalent of first-class mail. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno,
which includes an extensive and thorough discussion of the technology behind the
Internet,132 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that
e-mail is “comparable in principle to sending a first class letter.”133 In United States
v. Charbonneau, the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio stated that
“[e]-mail is almost equivalent to sending a letter via the mails.”134
E. Differences Between E-Mail and First-Class Mail Are Minor in Light of the
Flexible Due Process Standards and the Improvements in E-Mail Technology
Although e-mail and first-class mail parallel each other, there are differences
between the two that are potentially significant for purposes of due process. The
biggest differences are in the reliability, security, and appearance of the two forms of
communication. However, these differences are either overcome by the broad
concept of reasonableness that predominates due process, rendered irrelevant for
purposes of due process, or will diminish as e-mail technology improves. The
similarities between the two are compelling enough to overcome the differences so
that e-mail, like first-class mail, is a constitutional form of class action notice.
1. Differences in Reliability
One difference between e-mail and first-class mail involves issues of reliability.
If e-mail is significantly less reliable than postal mail, it may not be “reasonably
certain” under Mullane to inform class members of the action and the opportunity to
exercise their rights.135 One argument that e-mail is not as “reasonably certain” to
reach its recipient, and therefore does not meet due process standards like traditional
mail does, is that the postal service, unlike e-mail providers, will forward an
individual’s mail when he or she changes addresses.136 Another potential difference
in reliability has to do with who controls each form of mail: because traditional
postal mail is authorized by the Constitution,137 protected by statute,138 and
controlled by the government,139 some could argue that it is more reliable than email, which is not controlled by one central authority.140
SOC’Y 751, 754 (1996) ([“E-mail allows users to communicate typewritten messages, much
like postal mail (snail mail), except much faster.”).
132

929 F. Supp. at 830-49.

133

Id. at 834. See also Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436,
440 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 834).
134

979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997).

135

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).

136

See Victoria Hall, Return to Sender, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING, Jan. 1997, at 50.

137

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

138

18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).

139

David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and
Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 84 (1993).
140

See id.
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The problem of forwarding is the strongest argument that e-mail is not as certain
as first-class mail to reach its intended recipient and therefore does not meet the
Mullane test. It is not unusual for e-mail users to change Internet service providers,
and therefore, e-mail addresses.141 However, most service providers do not forward
mail; once a user leaves a provider, the user is no longer paying for services and
therefore the provider has no reason to forward e-mail to a new address.142
Therefore, if class action notice is sent to an old e-mail address, it is less likely to
reach the recipient than if the notice is sent by postal mail. This problem has only
recently come to light and a number of solutions are being developed. Several
companies on the Internet are now offering forwarding services.143 The company
provides a user with a permanent e-mail address and forwards the user’s mail to the
user’s current e-mail service provider.144 The problem with this service is the
possibility that the forwarding service could go out of business or that the customer
could become unsatisfied and want to change services, in which case the user would
be right back where he or she started, with an outdated e-mail address.145 Currently,
the only permanent solution is for users to register their own domain name and only
use e-mail providers that will host their domain.146
The difference in forwarding services between e-mail and postal mail is a
potential problem for purposes of due process in a (b)(3) class action because e-mail
notice is not certain to reach its intended recipient if he or she has changed e-mail
addresses. But the problem is relatively small for three reasons. First, the Mullane
standard is a broad standard of reasonableness, allowing room for the possibility that
notice may not reach its destination.147 Although e-mail may not be absolutely
certain to reach its intended recipient, it is still safe to say that the vast majority of
messages reach their desired destination, making it “reasonably certain” under
Mullane that e-mail notice will apprise class members of the action.148
Second, e-mail is an evolving technology that is improving daily due to the
competitive nature of the market. The more consumer demand there is for reliable
forwarding services, the more eager companies will be to find a solution to the
problem.
Third, e-mail makes up for its forwarding deficiencies because it is more reliable
than postal mail in a number of other ways. The fact that e-mail is controlled by
141

The author has had six different e-mail addresses from 1993 until the time of this
writing.
142

See Hall, supra note 136, at 50.

143

See
Yahoo!
Forwarding
Services
(visited
Mar.
29,
1999)
<http://dir.yahoo.com/Business_and_Economy/Companies/Internet_Services/E-mail_
Providers/Forwarding_Services>. The forwarding services generally charge a monthly or
yearly rate, although some services will forward for free if the user allows an advertisement at
the bottom of each message the service processes. See Hall, supra note 136, at 52.
144

See Hall, supra note 136 at 52.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Hall, supra note 136; Part IV.B.
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See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
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many different entities may actually make it more reliable than the postal mail, since
the competition for e-mail users causes service providers to ensure that their services
are reliable. Also, because e-mail is delivered much more quickly than traditional
mail, there is less time spent en route, during which traditional mail can be lost.149
For all practical purposes, individuals and businesses believe e-mail is just as
reliable as postal mail, if not more so. Millions of documents that used to be sent by
mail are now being sent by e-mail, including important documents and
correspondence.150 If the general public has put its faith in the reliability of e-mail
delivery in comparison with first class mail, then e-mail notice in a class action
should, like first class mail, meet the requisite due process standards.
2. Differences in Security
Another difference between e-mail and postal mail is that e-mail may be less
secure than postal mail. Internet security has been a subject of much debate.151 As
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pointed out, “unlike postal
mail, simple e-mail generally is not ‘sealed’ or secure, and can be accessed or
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and the recipient.”152 E-mail
is not in an envelope the way postal mail is, protecting it from outside readers, such
as service providers. If e-mail is substantially less secure than postal mail, the two
mails may be different enough that e-mail should not satisfy due process the way
postal mail does.
The answer to the problem is quite simple: the fact that someone else can read a
user’s e-mail notice really does not matter for purposes of due process in class action
notice. None of the due process standards set forth by the United States Supreme
Court require that the notice be secure from outside readers.153 In fact, if notice is
published, which due process permits for unlocatable class members, potentially
millions of people who are not in the class will read the notice.154 Although an
individual e-mail message, unlike published notice, is connected to an individual,

149

See Friel, supra note 5, at 311-12 (“[E]-mail, when sent, gets delivered instantaneously
to the recipient.”); Tickle, supra note 129, at 394-95 (“E-mail is interactive in nature and can
involve almost instantaneous communication, more like a telephone than regular mail.”);
Norman, supra note 131, at 328 (“First class mail, or snail mail, cannot compete with e-mail
because the message or the message with attached document is delivered instantaneously.”).
150
See Sundstrom, supra note 2, at 2064 (“Electronic mail . . . is rapidly supplementing,
and often replacing, traditional forms of personal and business communication.”); David E.
Haddock, As a Matter of Fact, I do Own the Whole Damned Road: Municipal Impediments to
Advance Telecommunications Services Through Control of the Public Right of Way, 28 PAC.
L.J. 947 (1997) (“[M]any Americans are more likely to send electronic rather than paper
mail.”).
151

See Denise Samoriski, et al., Electronic Mail, Privacy, and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Winter 1996, at 60.
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American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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See supra Part II.B.
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See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
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some courts have allowed individual notice to be sent in forms that don’t protect
from the uninvited eye, such as on post cards.155
The fact that an intermediary could read a user’s e-mail does matter in other areas
of law, particularly regarding the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures.156 For instance, the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio has recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
transmitting e-mail and that police officials cannot intercept e-mail transmissions
without probable cause and a search warrant.157 But the Supreme Court has not
identified privacy as an issue for purposes of due process in a class action and e-mail
security should not be an issue under the traditional due process standards.
Although not dispositive of the constitutionality of e-mail notice, security
measures are being developed for e-mail so that it is as secure from the uninvited eye
as traditional mail. One such measure is encryption.158 Encryption software
scrambles the message while it is in transit, then unscramble it once the recipient
receives it.159 Encryption can be analogized to an envelope for post mail.160
Furthermore, both forms of mail are protected from interception by statute.161 Postal
laws protect first-class mail,162 while the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 protects e-mail.163
Any differences in security between e-mail notice and notice by traditional mail
are irrelevant for purposes of due process. The fact that an intermediary could read
an e-mail message if it is not sealed has no bearing on the constitutionality of e-mail
class action notice under the Mullane standard. Therefore, class action notice by email should satisfy due process requirements, just as first-class mail does.
3. Differences in Appearance
A final difference between e-mail and postal mail that may be material for
purposes of due process is the difference in appearance between e-mail and postal
mail. While postal mail is tangible, e-mail is not.164 E-mail is often considered to be
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See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997); United States
v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996); Sundstrom, supra note 2.
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Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184.
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EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 183.
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See Morgan, supra note 9, at 98.
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Loundy, supra note 131, at 153-54 (“U.S. mail, or ‘snail mail,’ is governed by a statute
which gives “regular” mail the same kind of privacy that the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act gives E-mail.”).
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18 U.S.C. § 1702.
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18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1994). The statutes protect both mails from interception in
transit and while being stored. Loundy, supra note 131, at 154.
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See Salbu, supra note 131, at 472.
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less formal than traditional mail.165 If postal mail is more tangible and “official” in
appearance than e-mail, class members might take notice by postal mail more
seriously and be less likely to disregard postal notice as “junk mail.” If the
difference is strong enough, e-mail may not be “reasonably calculated” to reach its
recipient under the Mullane standard.
However, any differences between the appearances of e-mail and first-class mail
are trivial and irrelevant. It is true that postal mail is tangible while e-mail is not.
But just as there is no requirement that notice be read to be accurate,166 there is no
requirement that it be tangible to be accurate either.167 Courts have refused to
require more “official” forms of notice, such as certified mail, registered mail, or
service of process, showing that an official appearance does not make one form of
notice more constitutional than another.168 If the recipient disregards the mail as
junk mail, that is the fault of the recipient, not the sender; the sender still reasonably
attempted to apprise the recipient of the action, and due process does not require
actual notice.169
Although it is immaterial for purposes of due process, e-mail is evolving to look
more “official.” E-mail can be used as an informal method of communication, but
individuals are also using it to send more formal correspondences as well.170 Tools
such as scanners and formatting programs such as Adobe Acrobat allow users to
compose and send an e-mail message that looks exactly like a paper document.171
Additionally, it is now possible to digitally sign an e-mail document, a further
method of authentication.172 As with the areas of reliability and security, the
differences in appearance between e-mail and traditional mail are so minor that they
should not overcome the many similarities between the two forms of individual
notice. E-mail notice, like notice by first-class mail, should meet the due process
requirements in a class action lawsuit.
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See Ian C. Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs and Risks Associated with
Electronic Discovery, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 8 (1998).
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Id.
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See Salbu, supra note 131, at 472 (“[T]he distinguishing element[] . . . of tangibility [is]
not [a] meaningful difference[] in regard to the law of defamation.”). Additionally, if
tangibility does make a difference, e-mail messages can be printed out and kept in tangible
form.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Samoriski, supra note 151, at 60.
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A scanner is a machine that attaches to a computer that will scan a document like a
photocopy; the copy that is saved in the computer looks exactly like the paper version. Adobe
Acrobat documents “are created with a portable document form (PDF) that enables documents
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Harrison, supra note 9, at 477.
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See Bradley J. Hillis, From An Internet E-Mail Directory to a Secure Communications
Network, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 1998, at 30-31.
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V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CLASS ACTIONS ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO
ALLOW E-MAIL NOTICE
Individual notice by e-mail in a (b)(3) class action should meet the due process
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court for the many reasons set forth in this
note, the most compelling of which is that e-mail is so similar to first-class mail.173
But there is one way in which e-mail notice is superior to notice by first-class mail:
cost savings.174 Because of that cost savings, notice by e-mail will aid class plaintiffs
in bringing viable claims much more effectively than notice by first-class mail,
which can sometimes be cost prohibitive.175 Since e-mail notice should meet the due
process requirements for class action notice and is a much less expensive way to
transmit notice, it will become the preferred way to send notice, especially in large
class actions.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen made it clear that cost was not to be a
consideration in deciding what type of notice is required in a given situation and that
the representative plaintiffs must bear the cost of notice.176 However, this position
ignores one of the primary purposes of Rule 23: to allow a method of recovery for
the small claimant where it would be impracticable for the claimant to sue
individually.177 If the costs of notice are prohibitive, then potentially meritorious
claims are extinguished.178 The decision in Eisen has been largely criticized for
undermining Rule 23 and bringing the end to claims that cannot be brought any other
way.179 There have even been attempts to amend Rule 23 to allow cost of notice to
be a legitimate consideration in class actions.180
173

See supra Part IV.D.
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See Frieling, supra note 3, at 121 (“It [e-mail] delivers what mail always promised, and
never provided: virtually instant communications at any distance, at a very low cost.”); Held,
supra note 123, at 105 (“Businesses are discovering that E-mail is an excellent way for people
to communicate quickly, without the interruptions of phone calls or the expense of express
couriers.”; see Norman, supra note 131, at 328 (“[E]-mail can . . . be less expensive than other
communication mediums because no paper is used.”).
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See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
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See Zachary A. Smith, Class Action: State Notification Requirements After Eisen, 8 W.
ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980) (pointing out that the number of class actions brought in federal court
for the year after Eisen decreased 9.6%); Duane W. Reno, Notice and Due Process in Federal
Class Actions: A Requiem for Revised Rule 23, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 479, 516 (1975)
(“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rule as requiring that class representatives to bear
the cost of the notice presently required by the Rule . . . serves to discourage small claimants
from filing class suits, and further defeats the purposes of the Rule.”); Lucy West Behymer,
Case Comment, 16 B.C. INDUST. & COMM. L. REV. 254 (1975); Newberg, supra note 31, at
§ 8.03 (“The consequence of the Eisen II (and ultimately Eisen IV) refusal to weigh cost
factors as a moderating practicability is the sacrifice of potentially meritorious claims, which
the court had warned against in the very same breath.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 2d § 1788 at 233-34 (1986) (“The effect of this limitation is
to make the initiation of class actions more burdensome.”).
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Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen, attorneys bringing class actions
have had to work to circumvent the cost allocation mandate. One avenue, which
Justice Douglas advocated in his Eisen dissent, has been to break the class down into
subclasses and try one subclass as a test case first.181 Since the subclass would be
small, the costs of notice would be diminished.182
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did take a step back from Eisen’s rigid stance on
cost allocation with its decision in Oppenheimer Fund. There the Court held that
district courts have the discretion to order a defendant to perform tasks, such as
identifying class members or compiling their addresses, if the defendant can do so at
less cost than the plaintiff class representatives, as well as discretion to allocate the
cost of those tasks to the defendant.183 The Court stated that “[it is not] improper for
the court to consider the potential impact that rulings on these issues may have on the
expense that the representative plaintiff must bear in order to send the notice.”184
Both before and after the Oppenheimer Fund decision, attorneys have tried to
alleviate the costs of notice by including notice in the defendant’s regular
correspondence with class members.185 Some courts also have allowed costs to be
paid out of a settlement fund set up in a related or overlapping action.186
Although the Eisen Court clearly stated that cost should not be a factor in
deciding what is proper notice in a class action, cost has always been a factor that
even the Supreme Court has considered, even if only subconsciously. In Mullane,
the Court refused to require personal service, citing expense as one reason.187 The
sheer fact that the Court has not required actual notice and has never required that
notice be sent by certified or registered mail rather than first-class mail also
demonstrates that the Court impliedly considers cost a factor in deciding what
method of notice satisfies due process requirements.188
Class action notice by e-mail is an excellent answer to the problem of notice
costs, especially in large class actions. Notice by e-mail would not involve the costs
of paper, printing, and postage incurred from notice by traditional mail. The only
As mentioned in Part II.B of this note, Eisen was the product of many years of litigation
and several trips up and down through the federal judicial system. At one point, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York had allowed for allocation of the
cost of notice to the defendant of a large class action if the plaintiff could show a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
180

See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 42 (1996).
181
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costs for e-mail notice would be the monthly online service fee, generally less than
twenty dollars, and any labor needed to compile the class list and type in the e-mail
addresses. In the Eisen case, postage costs alone for the class of at least 2,250,000
class members189 would be $742,500 at today’s first class postage rate.190 Notice by
e-mail would save a tremendous amount of money, especially if the class attorneys
can obtain the names and e-mail addresses of class members from the defendants
under Oppenheimer Fund.
The cost savings of e-mail notice would not just benefit (b)(3) plaintiffs, but also
defendants of class actions as well. Costs of notice in a (b)(3) class action can be
allocated to the defendant as part of a settlement agreement.191 The notice required
by Rule 23(e), which applies to all 3 types of classes, is often paid for by defendants
as part of settlement as well.192 Although Rule 23(e) is silent as to the due process
requirements for settlement notice under the rule, most courts hold that the
requirements for certification notice, under 23(c)(2), including individual notice, also
apply to 23(e).193 Therefore, defendants of class actions as well as plaintiff class
members would benefit from the cost savings of notice by e-mail.
Although, as the Eisen decision makes clear, rights should not be sacrificed for
the sake of cost, cost has traditionally been a factor in formulating due process
requirements and in deciding how individual notice must be sent to members of
(b)(3) class actions. And since notice by e-mail does meet the requirements of due
process, class members’ rights would not be sacrificed for cost. Additionally, e-mail
notice best advances the policy behind Rule 23 of allowing an avenue for the small
claimant to obtain relief. The tremendous cost savings of sending notice of a class
action by e-mail rather than by traditional mail is a compelling reason why district
court judges should seriously consider allowing individual notice to be sent by email when it is practicable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the last decade, American society has entered the computer age. With the
tremendous growth of the Internet and the popularity of services such as e-mail,
Americans are increasingly becoming dependent on an entity that will soon become
an integral part of Americana. With this new entity, as with any new invention,
comes adjustments. As the District Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces noted:
New technologies create interesting challenges to long established legal
concepts. Thus, just as when the telephone gained nationwide use and
acceptance, when automobiles became the established mode of
transportation, and when cellular telephones came into widespread use,
now personal computers, hooked up to large networks, are so widely used
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that the scope of the Fourth Amendment core concepts of “privacy” as
applied to them must be reexamined.194
Soon that day will come for the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment concepts of
due process as well. When that day does come, courts should not hesitate to allow
individual notice of a class action to be sent by e-mail. E-mail meets the most
stringent due process requirement for class action notice, individual notice,195 and fits
well into the reasonableness standards of Mullane and the flexibility that due process
has traditionally allowed.196 Most importantly, e-mail is the functional equivalent of
first-class mail, as millions of Internet users already recognize.197 Although there are
some differences between the two, those differences are either irrelevant for
purposes of due process or will be extinguished as the young technology of e-mail
develops.198
Additionally, notice by e-mail will further the policy behind class action
litigation and Rule 23(b)(3). If the costs of notice are prohibitive, and sometimes are
when notice is sent by first-class mail, then potentially meritorious claims are
extinguished because they are too small to bring individually.199 Where e-mail meets
due process requirements and is much less expensive than any other form of
individual notice, courts should not only be ready, but eager, to allow notice by email in order to give full effect to the purpose behind class action litigation.
E-mail could revolutionize not only notice in a class action, but the very nature of
class litigation itself. Just as class attorneys could send notice of opt out rights by email rather than postal mail, class members could exercise their opt-out rights by email.200 Contact between class counsel and absent class members may no longer be
limited to a notice of certification and a notice of settlement. Class counsel could
keep class members informed of activity in the suit conveniently and at almost no
cost by creating a list of their e-mail addresses and forwarding one message to all
members with a click of the mouse.201
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The major obstacle to class action notice by e-mail at present is not the
Constitution, but practicality.202 Although millions of individuals do use e-mail, the
numbers show that it is still far from a household staple.203 However, what is most
important is not the number of current users, but the growth rate, which no one can
deny is exponential.204 It is only a matter of time before e-mail is as common as
traditional mail and e-mail overtakes “snail” mail as the preferred method of
transmitting individual notice in a 23(b)(3) class action.
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